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DEFENDING MINING CLAIMS AND MINERAL LEASES
IN ENVIRONMENTAL SUITS AGAINST FEDERAL
LAND MANAGERS
ERIC

I.

TWELKER*

INTRODUCTION

A recent development in environmental lawsuits is threatening federal mining claimants' and federal mineral lessees' interests in federal
public lands. Environmental groups are challenging decisions by the
Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") and Forest Service that create
property interests or development rights. In a worst case scenario,
courts could find that claimants and lessees never had valid property
interests.
The suits jeopardize the title of thousands of mining claims and
mineral leases. The cases presenting the most striking examples are Na3
2
tional Wildlife Federationv. Burford,I Connor v. Burford, Sierra Club v. Watt,

and Bob MarshallAlliance v. Watt. 4 From the claimants' and lessees' point
of view, these decisions granted environmental groups sweeping,
though somewhat ill-defined, relief. For example, hundreds of federal
land management decisions have been enjoined in a single action. 5
* Attorney, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Denver, Colorado.
1. 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985),preliminaryinjunction aff'd, 835 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir.
1987), dismissed, No. 85-2238, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Nov. 4, 1988), appeal docketed, No. 88-5397
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 1988). This suit challenges Federal Land Policy and Management Act
and National Environmental Policy Act procedural compliance for withdrawal revocations
and classification terminations made after January 1, 1981. A preliminary injunction was
issued on February 10, 1986 and affirmed by the court of appeals on December 11, 1987,
barring the government from approving surface disturbing work. The injunction was dissolved and the case dismissed for want of standing on November 4, 1988. The merits of
the case have yet to be addressed. For other comment on the case see Lusting, Recent
Strugglesfor Control of the Public Lands: Shall We "Deliver it up to the Wild Beasts?", 57 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 593, 612-16 (1986) (National Wildlife Federation attorney discusses early developments in case).
2. 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988),petitionfor
cert. filed sub nom. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Conner, Nov. 25, 1988. Because an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") was not done for oil and gas lease issuance, the
court set aside the administrative actions that were precursors to lease issuance, placing
the leases in jeopardy. The court of appeals reduced the leases to "rights of first refusal."
848 F.2d at 1447 n.16.
3. 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985). This case set aside the decision of the Secretary of the Interior to remove certain lands from wilderness study. The complaint was
filed in federal district court on January 13, 1983 and decided on April 18, 1985. For
other comment on this case see Lustig, supra note 2.
4. Bob Marshall Alliance v. Watt, 685 F. Supp. 1514 (D. Mont. 1986), af'd, Bob
Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed sub nom.
Kohlman v. Bob Marshall Alliance, Nov. 29, 1988. This case is similar to Conner v. Burford,
except there is no issue ofjoinder of absent lessees.
5. Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985) (711 oil and gas leases
affected); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. at 321 ("Hundreds ....
perhaps thousands of
varying interests"); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
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The challenges by environmental groups are based on statutes
designed to bring environmental considerations before federal decisionmakers. The National Environmental Policy Act 6 ("NEPA") and Federal
Land Policy and Management Act 7 ("FLPMA") sections at issue merely
dictate decision process, and are not intended to mandate land management decisions favoring environmentalists. 8 The primary interest of environmental groups such as the Sierra Club 9 and the National Wildlife
Federation' is not procedure. These groups are interested in what is
happening on the land, specifically, whether mineral extraction is degrading environmental values. But since a court will more closely review an agency's deviation from mandated procedure than the substance
of the decision itself, the statutes are a potent weapon in the environmental lawyer's arsenal.I' The claimants and lessees are caught in the
middle of the exchange between environmentalists and federal agencies.
Lawsuits that indirectly challenge leases and claims are unlike environmental challenges to fixed projects such as highways or dams. Those
affected often times do not know exactly what is at stake. When the challenge is indirect, unexplored, or partially explored, proper ties have
only speculative value and the claimants and lessees are often unwilling
or unable to engage in a fight with well-heeled environmental public
interest law firms. While the federal government has defended the suits,
their interests and those of the claimants and lessees may diverge. Industry oriented public interest law firms-in particular, Mountain States
Legal Foundation-have represented the claimants and lessees.' 2 But
since the principal parties are public interest firms and the government,
the cases are often argued on a public policy level without concern for a
given piece of private property.
In the context of the four cases mentioned above, this paper addresses the rights and remedies of claimants and lessees before, during
and after environmental procedural suits that indirectly challenge federal mining claims and mineral leases.
(7000 claims and 1000 leases affected by 814 agency actions revoking withdrawals or terminating classifications). See also Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466

(9th Cir. 1986) and Sierra Club v. Penfold, 659 F. Supp. 965 (D. Alaska 1987) (both cases
halting numerous mining operations).

6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1982).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1982).
8. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980).

9. Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund represents the plaintiff in Sierra Club v. Watt,
608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Sierra Club v. Penfold, 659 F. Supp. 965 (D. Alaska
1987); Bob Marshall Alliance v. Watt, 685 F. Supp. 1514 (D. Mont. 1986); and Northern
Alaska Environmental Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986).

10. The National Wildlife Federation represents the plaintiff in National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp.
107 (D. Mont. 1985).

11. See infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
12. Mountain States Legal Foundation represents claimants and lessees in Sierra Club
v. Watt, Connor, National Wildlife Federation, and Bob MarshallAlliance. Pacific Legal Foundation of Sacramento, California, represents the Alaska Miners Association in Northern Alaska
Environmental Center and Sierra Club v. Penfold.
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II.

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND MINERAL PROPERTY
INTERESTS IN PUBLIC LANDS

Mining claims and mineral leases are at risk in environmental lawsuits against the government because the suits attack the administrative
decisions that created the development rights or property title. An understanding of how the administrative procedures at issue apply to public land decisions is necessary to understand the position of the
claimants and lessees.
A.

Administrative Discretion in Creation of Mineral Interests in Public Lands

Public attitudes and political processes combined with vested economic interests shaped the nature and means of acquiring mineral interests in public lands.' 3 In the nineteenth century, the public perceived
the resources of the public lands to be virtually inexhaustible. Because
there was no perceived need for administrative control, mining claim
locators could acquire mineral resources, with the exception of coal,
under the General Mining Law of 1872 by being the first to make a valid
discovery. 14 By today's standards, patents were issued with relative
ease.
In recent years public attitudes have changed; the public and environmental groups now demand vigilant administrative control over extraction of resources from public lands. 15 It is now known these
resources are no longer inexhaustible. The law subjects agencies to substantive and procedural constraints.1 6 If a procedurally deficient discretionary decision adversely affects members of the public, then they may
sue to have the decision "set aside." The suit may jeopardize a mineral
lease or mining claim based on the underlying decision.
In the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,17 Congress provided the Secretary of the Interior with "discretion" to lease oil, gas and several other
minerals. Today, the Secretary must consider environmental concerns.
The government may place three types of environmental controls on
mineral leases at the lease issuance stage. First, the agency may reject
the lease offer for environmental reasons.18 Second, it may add lease
13. See generally PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
1 (1970); P. GATES, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT chs. I &
XXII (1968); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING ch.4 (2d ed. 1986).
14. General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (1982). See generally 1 AMERICAN
LAND ix,

LAw OF MINING § 4.08-. 11 (2d ed. 1986) (describes early application of the General Mining
Law).
15. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND ch. 7
(1970).
16. Id.; see Lustig, supra note 1.
17. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982). In addition to oil and gas the Mineral Leasing Act
covers oil shale, sodium, sulfur and potash. The Acquired Lands Leasing Act of 1947, 30
U.S.C. §§ 351-59 (1982), extended the 1920 Act authority to lands acquired by the federal
government.
18. The discretion of the Secretary to reject leases may be limited by FLPMA. See
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383, 397 (D. Wyo. 1980) (holding
that non-action on leases is a defacto withdrawal in violation of FLPMA § 204, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1714 (1982), and that FLPMA § 310, 43 U.S.C. § 1740 (1982) requires that standards for
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stipulations to protect environmental values and require reclamation.19
Third, Congress may restrict or preclude leasing by specific acts 20 or by
riders to appropriations bills which preclude expenditures for lease
2
processing. '
After a lease is issued, permits are necessary for any kind of surfacedisturbing exploration or development work. 22 For example, oil and
gas leases require approval of an application for a permit to drill
("APD") for any exploratory or development drilling. 23 Although a
land manager may be without the discretion to deny a permit, depending on the lease stipulations, 24 the permit is always subject to terms
25
which are formulated with the exercise of administrative discretion.
That exercise of discretion introduces the possibility of environmental
litigation based on environmental and land management procedural
statutes.
Metallic and other "hardrock" minerals continue to be available for
lease rejection be placed in regulations); Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 852
F.2d 1223 (D. Wyo. 1988) (same issue). See also Comment, Mining and Mineral Leasing on
Bureau of Land Management Lands During Wilderness Review, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 297 (1982)
(case comment on Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979)); RMOGA v. Andrus,
500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980) (prior to reversal on appeal); and Mountain States
Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980)). See infra notes 226-32 and
accompanying text.
19. See Muys, Shepherd and Smith, Environmental Considerations in Public Lands Mineral
Leasing and Development II, 1-5, 10-14, 19-20, in Proceedings, Public Lands Mineral Leasing;
Issues and Directions, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of
Law (June 10-11, 1985) (discussing stipulations); Axline, Private Rights to Public Oil and Gas,
19 IDAHO L. REV. 505, 519-51 (1983) (discussing the validity of environmental protection
stipulations in federal oil and gas leases); Noble, Oil and Gas Leasing on Public Lands: NEPA
Gets Lost in the Shuffle, 6 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 117, 133-39 (1982) (discussion enforceability
of stipulations); Watson, Mineral and Oil and Gas Development in Wilderness Areas and Other
Specially Managed FederalLands in the United States, 29 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 37 (1983)
(good practical overview); Martin, The Interrelationships of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, the
Wilderness Act and the EndangeredSpecies Act: A Conflict in Search of Resolution, 12 ENVrL. L. 363,
411-20 (1982) (criticizing use of stipulations). Use of restrictive stipulations must bejustified by the record before the agency. James M. Chudnow, 76 I.B.L.A. 167, GFS (O&G)
289 (1983). See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying test. In national forests the Secretary
of Agriculture is responsible for surface resources, while the Secretary of Interior has authority over subsurface resources. While the issuance of leases is nominally the responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior, a 1987 amendment to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act
gives the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to veto leases on national forest lands. 30
U.S.C. § 226(h) (1982).
20. E.g., The Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982) (precludes leasing in designated wilderness areas after Dec. 31, 1983).
21. E.g., Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub.
L. No. 98-473, § 308, 98 Stat. 1871 (1985).
22. FLPMA § 302(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982); 43 C.F.R. pt. 3045 (1986). See also 1
LAw OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES §§ 16.05[2], 16.05[4], 17.05 (1986) (geophysical

activities and bond requirements). Permits to do surface disturbing work on national forest lands are covered by 36 C.F.R. § 251.50-251.64 (1986) and FOREST SERVICE MANUAL
§ 2820.
23. 43 C.F.R. subpt. 3162 (1986). See generally 1 LAw OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES
§ 16.07[l][c] (1986).
24. See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stipulations giving
authority to deny later activity approved); Getty Oil Co. v. Clark, 614 F. Supp. 904, 915 (D.
Wyo. 1985) (stipulations giving authority to deny later activity approved).
25. E.g., 614 F. Supp. at 915.
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location under the General Mining Law of 1872.26 A claimant benefits
from the location system because the discretion of administrators is severely limited. Until the 1960's, a claimant could locate a claim, make a
discovery, and proceed to patent without encountering a discretionary
decision by a land manager. 27 Without the exercise of administrative
28
discretion the environmental procedures could not apply.
More recently, agencies have been given limited authority to exercise discretion over activities conducted under the Mining Law. The
substantive mandates of the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897,29 Surface Resources Act of 1955,30 and FLPMA3 1 are examples. Under these
acts, Forest Service and BLM administrators may exercise a limited, but
significant, amount of discretion to prevent "undue degradation" or
damage of surface resources. Regulations now require a "plan of operations" for most surface-disturbing work on unpatented federal mining
claims. The agency reviews the "plan," and in its discretionary power,
imposes conditions to prevent unacceptable surface damage.3 2 While
normally a land manager may not totally deny operations on mining
claims,3 3 any conditions imposed on the plan involve administrative discretion and the consequent procedural restrictions, including the possi34
bility of an environmental impact statement ("EIS") under NEPA.
26.

30 U.S.C. § 22-54 (1982).

See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING tit. IV (2d ed.

1986) (comprehensive discussion of requirement of current location system).
27. See Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 194 U.S. 220, 227 (1904) (valid
claim segregates property from public domain and makes it the property of the locator
through patent).
28. See South Dakota v. Andrus, 714 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
822 (1980) (patent issuance is a ministerial act). South Dakota v. Andrus is being challenged,
at least indirectly, in a current suit by the State of Colorado. Lamm v. Hodel, No. 87-F190 (D. Colo. filed Feb. 4, 1987).
29. Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34-36 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 475-82, 551 (1982)). Discretionary administration was introduced with the promulgation of regulations by the Forest Service in 1974.
30. 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-15 (1982). See United States v. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290 (9th
Cir. 1979) (Surface Use Act of 1955 does not restrict activity reasonably incident to mining), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980).
31. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1982) (department shall take action necessary to prevent
unnecessary and undue degradation of lands). Regulations interpreting this provision for
activity conducted pursuant to the General Mining Law are found at 36 C.F.R. pt. 228 and
43 C.F.R. subpts. 3802 & 3809. See generally Kimball, Impact of BLM Surface Management
Regulations on Exploration and Mining Operations, 28 RocKY MTN. L. INST. 509, 563-70 (1982).

32. Forest Service regulations are found at 36 C.F.R. §§ 228.4, 228.8 (1986). BLM
regulations are found at 43 C.F.R. §§ 3802.1, 3809.1-3809.2 (1986).
33. Opinion of Solicitor Coldiron, 88 I.D. 909 (October 5, 1981); United States v.
Weiss, 642 F.2d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1980) (regulations based on Organic Act of 1897 must
be reasonable). FLPMA §§ 302(b), 601(f) & 603, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1732(b), 1781(f), & 1782
(1982), provide for amendment to the General Mining Law. Of these, section 603 will
have the most significant impact on a plan of operations. See, e.g., Keith R. Kummerfeld,
74 I.B.L.A. 106, GFS (Min) 165 (1983).
34. See 43 C.F.R. § 3809.1-6(a)(2) (1986) (BLM lands); 36 C.F.R. § 228.5(a)(3) (1986)
(Forest Service lands).
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ProceduralConstraints on the Exercise of Administrative Discretion
1. The Administrative Procedure Act and Standards of Review

To date, judicial review authorized by the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"), section 10(3),3 5 has been the sole means of obtaining judicial relief for violations of environmental and land management procedure.3 6 For example, if a plaintiff alleges an agency violation of NEPA,
then the plaintiff must prove that the agency action fails to comply with
NEPA when judged by the standards of review found in the APA. If the
agency's action does not meet the APA review standards, then the APA
37
authorizes the court to "set aside" the action.
Under the traditional standard, judicial review is limited. A court
may "set aside" discretionary agency actions only where they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law." '3 8 The decision will stand unless it is a clear error of judgment, did not consider the relevant factors, or was made in reliance on
prohibited considerations.3 9 The "arbitrary and capricious" standard
normally applies to adjudications of decisions to execute an agency ac40
tion or judgment of factual determinations by agencies.
For procedural violations, the APA provides that a court may set
aside an agency action for failure to comply with "procedure required by
law."' 4 1 In the absence of a statutorily prescribed standard of review, the
courts have upheld agency actions if the procedural compliance is
42
"reasonable."
It is unclear which standard should apply to review of compliance
with procedural statutes like NEPA. In preparation of NEPA documents, such as environmental assessments ("EA") or EISs, an agency
must exercise its discretion in many substantive ways. For example, it
must explain the facts of environmental impact, decide the scope of the
proposal, and' 43decide how to contact the public. Yet the entire effort is
"procedural."
The result of this mix of substance and procedure is a
35. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
36. See 5 B. MEZINES,J. STEIN,J. BRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 4502 (1985) (APA only
grants right to judicial review; jurisdiction depends on an outside statutory source).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
39. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
40. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlan, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980).
APA review may have a substantive impact on cases. For example, in Sierra Club v. Watt,
the court overturned Secretary Watt's decision to exclude tracts of less than 5,000 acres
from wilderness study because the record reflected that Watt relied on an incorrect interpretation of section 603 of FLPMA. 608 F. Supp. 305, 342 (E.D. Cal. 1985). See Lustig,
Recent Strugglesfor Control of Public Lands: Shall We "Deliver it up to the Wild Beasts?", 57 U.

COLO. L. REV. 593, 616-22 (1986) (National Wildlife Federation attorney discusses the
decision in Sierra Club v. Watt).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1982).
42. Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d
1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1982); Conservation Law Found. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 719 (1st
Cir. 1979); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1982).
43. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
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split in the circuits on which standard of review should apply.
Some circuits judge the threshold decision on whether to prepare
an EIS, and even some factual disputes involving EAs or EISs, by the
reasonableness standard. Other circuits use the more narrow arbitrary
and capricious standard. 44 The use of different standards for similar
procedural statutes within the same circuit, plus the application of an
additional "hard look" standard in environmental cases, compounds the
problem. 4 5 In many cases, the result of this apparent split is unclear:
But it does appear that courts in the "reasonableness" circuits have
more discretion to overturn agency decisions and thus create uncertainty for claimants and lessees.
2.

The Environmental Statutes

NEPA is foremost among the environmental statutes that affect
mineral property interests in public lands. The purpose of NEPA's EIS
requirements is to fully inform federal decision-makers of the relevant
environmental concerns 4 6 attendant to discretionary administrative decisions. The EIS is merely a procedure, which, if properly done, does
not affect the agency's discretion as to the substance of the ultimate
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974) (en
banc).
44. See Gee v. Boyd, 471 U.S. 1058 (1985) (White,J., dissenting), denying cert. to Gee v.
Hudson, 746 F.2d 1471 (4th Cir. 1984) (describes split in circuits on whether arbitrary and
capricious standard should be applied to NEPA questions). See also Shea, The Judicial Standardof Review for Environmental Impact Statement Threshold Decision, 9 B.C. ENV'rL. AFF. L. REV.
63 (1980); Comment, Shall We Be Arbitrary of Reasonable: Standards of Review for Agency
Threshold Decisions Under NEPA, 19 AKRON L. REV. 685 (1986). An agency will be given
deference for decisions involving technical and scientific matters. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 101 (1983); Friends of Endangered Species v.Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 1985). In application, there may be
little difference between the two standards.
45. For example, the Ninth Circuit applies a reasonableness standard to most, if not
all, NEPA related decisions. E.g., Friends of Endangered Species v.Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976,
985 (9th Cir. 1985) (reasonableness standard purportedly applied but cases from circuits
applying the arbitrary and capricious standard cited); Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep
v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1982) (reasonableness
standard applied). At the same time the Ninth Circuit has chosen to use the arbitrary and
capricious standard in judging the equally procedural consultation requirements of ESA.
Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 611 (9th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court
addressed review of the scrutiny an agency has given to considerations mandated by environmental procedural statutes in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 401 U.S. 402
(1971). The "hard look" requirement was first applied in Pikes Peak BroadcastingCo. v. FCC,
422 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and later used or mentioned in Supreme Court decisions.
See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97-100
(1983); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). The "hard look" has become a judicial standard of review for environmental cases, but it has received some criticism. See McGarity, Beyond the Hard Look: A New Standard for Judicial Review, 2 NATURAL
RESOURCES & ENV'T 32, 68 (1986) (courts should take a less intrusive role); Wald, Making
"Informed" Decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135 (1982) (D.C.
Circuit judge argues that because it is impossible for courts to become adequately informed, they should not substitute theirjudgment for that of the agencies). See generally D.
MANDELKER, NEPA: LAW AND LrrIGATION § 3:07 (1984).
46. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) ("NEPA procedures must insure that environmental in-

formation is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made").
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7

decision. 4
The actual wording of NEPA's EIS requirement is deceptively simple. The statute requires an EIS to accompany any proposal for a major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 4 8 Past disputes have most often involved the following: what
constitutes a "proposal;" what is the required scope of that proposal;
and whether an impact is "significant."
Because an EIS is a time consuming, expensive, and politically risky
undertaking, there is tremendous incentive to avoid producing one.
Consequently, if it is not readily apparent to an agency that the impact
of an action is "significant," then it will be inclined to do an EA. In
theory, an EA's purpose is to determine whether the action is significant
and requires an EIS. 4 9 If the EA discloses that the proposed action is
insignificant, as it usually does, then the agency will make a Finding of
No Significant Impact 5 ° ("FONSI"). If a type of action is almost always
insignificant, then the agency may avoid the obligation to do an EA by
use of a "categorical exclusion." 5' To meet the requirements of NEPA
and the regulations, an agency must rely on either an EIS, an EA and
'52
FONSI, or a "categorical exclusion."
The NEPA counts in the suits discussed in the paper have questioned the agency's determination how many future or related actions
should be included in the NEPA review. The issue is the "scope of the
action."' 5 3 In each case, the agency chose to consider a scope of action
that did not, by the agency's interpretation, reach the threshold "significant" level. In each case, environmental groups argued that the NEPA
review should have considered other actions, either possible future actions or other actions in the area, and therefore, an EIS, a programmatic
54
EIS, or a regional EIS was required.
A number of more specialized statutes have adapted the informa47. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978). See Pollock, Reimaging NEPA: Choicesfor Environmentalists, 9 HARV. ENv-rL.
L. REV. 359, 392-95 (1985) (because review is primarily procedural rather than substantive, the effect of NEPA will be primarily delay); but see Weinstein, Substantive Review under
NEPA after Vermont Yankee IV, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 937 (1985) (argues the Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983), will support a significant
aspect of substantive review attributable to NEPA).
48. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
49. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1986).
50. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1986).
51. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(a)(2), 1508.4, 1507.3(b)(2)(ii) (1986). Even a categorically
excluded action may be subject to the EA or EIS requirements if it has an impact that
warrants such considerations. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1986).
52. See Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 827-29 (9th Cir. 1986) (requirement of reasoned explanation not met for actions falling outside of categorical exclusion, but not
having an EA or EIS).
53. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (1986) (regulations define scope). See generally R.
MANDELKER, supra note 45, at ch. 9 (discusses scope of NEPA review). See infra notes 83-90
and accompanying text.
54. For example, in National Wildlife Federation, Northern Alaska Environmental Center and
Penfold, the plaintiffs argued that a programmatic or regional EIS was required to consider
cumulative impacts. In Bob Marshall Alliance and Connor, plaintiffs argued, and the court

19891

MINING CLAIMS AND MINERAL LEASES

tion procedural style of NEPA. For example, section 7 of the Endangered Species Act 55 ("ESA") requires that when agencies make
decisions affecting threatened or endangered species, the agency must
consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. The ESA differs from NEPA since separate provisions mandate that if actions place
threatened or endangered species at risk, then the Fish and Wildlife Service must issue a jeopardy decision and the agency must mitigate the
consequences or halt the project. 56 If there is no risk to threatened or
endangered species, then the Fish and Wildlife Service will issue a "no
jeopardy" opinion and the project may proceed. Another example is
57
section 810 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act,
("ANILCA") which requires that federal agencies review impacts on
subsistence hunting and fishing prior to making land management decisions in Alaska. 58
Because each of these statutes may be viewed as requiring a specialized type of environmental impact statement, the courts and parties in
environmental procedural suits have applied arguments and analysis developed in consideration of the NEPA claims. 59 Perhaps as a consequence, the briefs of the parties and the opinions of the courts have
treated ESA consolation and ANILCA section 810 claims as secondary
or subsidiary to NEPA claims. Another reason ESA claims are subsidiary to NEPA claims is because the heightened "reasonableness" standard of review has not been applied in ESA cases. 60
3.

The Land Management Statutes

Because the National Forest Management Act 6i and FLPMA 6 2 conagreed, that the scope of review should have included full field development with lease
issuance. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
55. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 93 Stat. 1225 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1549 (1982)) (section 7 codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982)). See
Martin, The Interrelationshipsof the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, the Wilderness Act, and the Endangered Species Act: A Conflict in Search of Resolution, 12 ENVrL. L. 363, 390-96 (1982) (discusses
the intent of the Endangered Species Act and court decisions interpreting that act in the
context of the Mineral Leasing Act).
56. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (highest priority is accorded protection of endangered species).
57. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat.
2371 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1982)) (section 810 codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 3120). The importance of section 810 was apparently overlooked in commentary on
ANILCA shortly after it was passed.
58. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987); Kunaknana v. Clark,
742 F.2d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 1984). While section 810's procedural requirement of informing the decision maker is similar to NEPA's, there are important substantive differences between the general environmental concerns of NEPA and the substantive concerns
of section 810. Consequently, one will not substitute for the other.
The relationship of section 810 and NEPA may be of critical importance in interpreting the Supreme Court's Village of Gambell decision. That decision invalidated a Ninth Circuit standard for issuance of a preliminary injunction that had been applied to both
ANILCA and NEPA.
59. See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1451-58 (9th Cir. 1988).
60. See, e.g., Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 610 (9th Cir. 1984) ("normal" arbitrary and capricious standard applies).
61. National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949
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tain numerous procedural requirements for discretionary land management decisions, they also provide numerous bases for environmental
procedural suits. 6 3 One of the pending suits, National Wildlife Federation,64 involves the following FLPMA provisions: (1) the requirement
that agencies set forth standards for land management decisions in regulations; 6 5 (2) the requirement that the agencies provide, in regulations,
the opportunity for public participation; 6 6 (3) the provisions governing
withdrawal revocation procedure; 67 (4) the provisions governing classification termination procedure; 68 and (5) the concept of "multiple
use." 69 Although National Wildlife Federation contains a sampling of the
potential problem areas of FLPMA, it is not exhaustive. Parts of
FLPMA, including the withdrawal revocation provision at issue in Na70
tional Wildlife Federation, are very complex, and confusing.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 7 1 ("OCSLA") is important
because many of the issues in the onshore environmental procedural
suits have already been litigated for offshore lease sales. 72 Nevertheless,
the Connor 7 3 court rejected the application of offshore precedents
thereby allowing staged review under both NEPA and ESA to onshore
situation. 74 Application of offshore precedent would have allowed sepa(1976), Forest and Rangeland Resource Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-378, 88 Stat. 477
(1974) (codified together at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1982)).
62. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982).
63. E.g., Sagebrush Rebellion v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1986) (notice and
hearing requirements for withdrawals, FLPMA § 204, 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1982)); National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985) (withdrawal revocation and
classification termination procedure). See also Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus,
499 F. Supp. 383, 397 (D. Wyo. 1980) (lessees base suit on failure of withdrawal procedure, see supra note 18).
64. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
65. Section 310, 43 U.S.C. § 1740 (1982).
66. Section 309, 43 U.S.C. § 1739 (1982).
67. Sections 204(a), (i) & (1), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a)(i)(1) (1982).
68. Section 202(d), 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1982).
69. Sections 103(c), 302(a), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702(c), 1732(a) (1982). The concept of
"multiple use" is a substantive mandate of FLPMA rather than a procedural one.
70. In light of the National Vildlife Federation suit, the most apparent example of this is
the withdrawal "termination" provisions of section 204(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(1) (1982). A
very plausible reading of this twisted section seems to indicate that all terminations or
revocations, no matter how small, must be submitted by Congress. This puts section
204(1) in conflict with sections 204(a) and (i), 43 U.S.C. § 17 14(a) & (i) (1982), which seem
to provide other means of "revocation" of withdrawals for routine administration of the
public lands. See Opinion of Associate Solicitor, Scope of Withdrawal Review Provisions of
FLPMA § 204(1) (Oct. 30, 1980). Further examination of the legislative history of
FLPMA, including predecessor bills, indicates that Congress only intended that major terminations be sent to Congress. See H.R. Rep. 92-1306, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43 (1972).
Perhaps because of its complicated and tenuous nature, the legislative history arguments
have not been fully considered in National Wildlife Federation.
71. 43 U.S.C. §§ 331-1356 (1982).
72. E.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531(1987) (addressing standards for preliminary injunctions in NEPA and ANILCA suits); Village of False Pass v.
Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984) (addressing ESA standard of review and EIS content
for staged review); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (staged
review under ESA).
73. Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), aff'd 848 F.2d 1441 (9th
Cir. 1988).
74. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1456-58 (9th Cir. 1988).
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rate NEPA consideration of exploration and would have been a profitable victory for the government. A principle reason for rejecting
application of offshore precedent is that the Minerals Management Ser75
vice retains the authority to cancel leases for environmental reasons
and compensate the lessees by returning unrecovered payments up to
76
the amount of the lessee's bonus and rental payments.
C.

Summary

The rights of claimants and lessees to develop minerals on the federal lands has been increasingly restricted by the discretion of federal
land administrators. Those administrators are bound by numerous procedures which may serve as the bases of suits by groups or individuals
unhappy with the substance of the agencies' decisions. The claimant or
lessee is placed in a position of relying on the regularity of the decisions
of federal land administrators to be assured of his property interest.
III.

THE MERITS:

DEFENDING AGENCY COMPLIANCE

The central issues in the environmental procedural suits are
whether the agencies complied with required procedure. Accordingly,
claimants and lessees are forced to evaluate the sufficiency of agency
procedural compliance when they accept approval of a lease or mining
plan of operations. If an environmental group alleges that an agency
has failed to comply with mandated procedure, then claimants and lessees must defend the government. A few of the more troublesome
points affecting the cases discussed in this paper are addressed below.
A.

Program or Regional Compliance Versus Project Compliance

The type of procedural failure that is the most sweeping and hardest for the lessees and claimants to detect is a failure of programmatic or
regional environmental compliance. Such failure may jeopardize the
most regular appearing agency action. 7 7 For example, in National Wildlife Federation, the plaintiff argues that because the agency had no
programmatic regulations 78 and no programmatic EIS, 79 hundreds of
75. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1982), 30 C.F.R. § 250.12 (1986). See also 2 LAW OF FEDERAL
OIL AND GAS LEASES § 25.06[4] (1986) (discussing cancellation provisions for offshore
leases). Another distinction between onshore and offshore situations is that an EIS is done
at each stage of leasing, exploration, or development under OCSLA. At least one commentator thinks this may be a requirement of the Act. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 45,
§ 2:23 (arguing that an EIS is required). See also Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464
U.S. 312, 335-40 (1984) (describes OCSLA review stages).
76. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(c) (1982).
77. For general information on NEPA programmatic EIS requirements, see D.
MANDELKER, supra note 45, § 9:02-08; Barney, The ProgrammaticEnvironmental Impact Statement and the National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1981).
The Council on Environmental Quality regulations provide guidance for programmatic
statements at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.4(b), 1508.18(b)(3) (1986).
78. Amended Complaint, Count V, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp.
271, (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238), preliminary injunction afftd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
79. Id., Count IV.
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withdrawal revocations and classification terminations done by the BLM
over a four and one-half year period were invalid. This was despite the
fact that the important actions had site specific NEPA documentation
80
and public participation.
NEPA contains no specific programmatic or regional EIS requirements. The requirements merely serve as part of the review of a single
action's cumulative impact. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court
stated that project review which covered all of the relevant concerns
would suffice, even if a required regional EIS had not been done. 8 1 In
light of recent decisions, this principal has not been recognized, and
mineral lessees or claimants should not rely on it. 82 A failure of
programmatic rulemaking requirements of FLPMA may have a similar
83
effect.
B.

Scope of NEPA Consideration

The courts have taken two approaches to the question of how much
future development the agencies must consider in NEPA review of mineral exploration. First, for mining exploration 84 and oil and gas exploration in the Tenth Circuit, 85 the agency may restrict the scope of the
action to the proposal itself and need not consider later stages such as
development and production.
The argument that persuaded courts in the above situations was
that subsequent stages of development are so speculative as to fall
outside of the ambit of NEPA. For example, in the overthrust belt areas
that were considered in the oil and gas leasing cases, lessees drill wildcat
wells on only about twenty-five percent of the leases, and only about two
80. See Federal Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 12-41, id. (describes general compliance and gives detail for one
area where the plaintiff alleged specific injury).
The two level nature of procedural compliance is dramatically illustrated by the
Northland dredging case. Tulkisarmute Native Community v. Conquerwood, No. 85-604
CIV (D. Alaska). Environmental groups unsuccessfully challenged the NEPA compliance
for a plan of operations of a remote Alaskan placer mining operation in an action before
the Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA"). Tulkisarmute Native Community Council,
et. al., 88 I.B.L.A. 210, GFS (Min) 125 (1985). They then appealed the IBLA decision to
the federal district court. In the meantime, another environmental group challenged all
approvals of placer mining in Alaska based on the failure of state-wide NEPA procedures
to mandate an EIS. Sierra Club v. Penfold, 659 F. Supp. 965 (D. Alaska 1987).' For a time,
Northland was faced with the prospect of losing its right to operate in two different simultaneous court actions challenging compliance with the same statute.
81. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 407 n.16, 414 n.26 (1976).
82. E.g., National Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club v. Penford, and Northern Alaska Envtl.
Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986) (all involve allegations of programmatic
failure without examination of site-specific compliance).
83. See Order of December 4, 1985, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp.
271 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238) (failure to make rules for public participation in management of public lands is basis for preliminary injunction).
84. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 510 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1981),
aff'd, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
85. Park County Resource Council v. United States Dept. of Agric., 817 F.2d 609,
622-24 (10th Cir. 1987).
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to three percent of the leases are ever developed.8 6 Odds of actual development are even less for mining leases.
In the second approach, adopted by the District of Columbia and
Ninth Circuits for oil and gas leases, if the agency retains discretion to
preclude significant impacts caused by later stages of development, then
NEPA review need not consider these stages. An agency may retain discretion by use of stipulations, by regulatory provisions, or by statute.
Conditional No Surface Occupancy ("CNSO") or contingent right stipulations may allow for preclusion of surface disturbing activity or for outright cancellation of a lease for environmental reasons. 8 7 Conner and
Sierra Club v. Peterson specifically approved the use of CNSO stipulations
to obviate the need for NEPA review of anything more than leasing at
the lease issuance stage.8 8 Offshore leasing cases already rely on this
rationale to permit staged or tiered NEPA review since the regulations
and OCSLA give the agency the authority to cancel leases for environmental reasons. 8 9 An EIS must be done before surface disturbing activities are allowed. 90
This "early application" makes sense in theory, but as a practical
matter, it would have little effect other than to increase paperwork.
Surely, if pre-exploration decisions contemplate the environmental disturbance of full field development, then they must also contemplate the
benefits of petroleum reserves; otherwise the decisions will be arbitrary
and capricious. The value of such reserves would be a sound basis for
the agency decision in all conceivable instances. Hence the full field EIS
would be little more than an expensive formality, and one that was useless in the ninety-eight percent of leases that never produce.
This application of NEPA has another, potentially more significant,
effect. In the past, multiple use mandates for public lands presumed
that all land was open to mineral development unless the agencies had
taken specific action to withdraw it. a ' Now, by application of NEPA process, including consideration of a "no action" alternative, the lands are
effectively considered closed, and may be opened to exploration at the
discretion of administrators.
86. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, OIL AND GAS GUIDE, NORTHERN REGION 16 (2d
ed. 1981).
87. See Muys, Shepherd and Smith, supra note 19 (excellent general discussion of stipulations including CNSO stipulations); Edelson, The Management of Oil and Gas Leasing on
Federal Wilderness Lands, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 905, 940-50 (1983) (discusses CNSO

stipulation and the district court ruling in Sierra Club v. Peterson prior to reversal by the
court of appeals). Leases that originally contained a CNSO stipulation were not appealed
by the Sierra Club, and consequently were not technically at issue. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The circuit court stated that an EIS or a binding stipulation was required to meet the requirements of NEPA. Id. at 1415. See infra
notes 226-32 and accompanying text.

88. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1449-50 (9th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
89. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.

90. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1446.
91. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383, 397 (D. Wyo. 1980).
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Rulemaking and Public Participationunder FLPMA and NFMA

Both FLPMA and NFMA contain requirements for public participation. Section 309(e) of FLPMA 92 is the most confusing. If the merits of
the National Wildlife Federation case are ever decided and the interpretation of the district court is upheld, then an administrator may have to
solicit public comment, through regulation, on "execution" of the smallest of agency actions if the actions involve "management of public
lands." Despite the fact that the important withdrawal revocations and
classification terminations at issue in National Wildlife Federationwere accompanied by public participation in the local area of the land action,
the court was unaware of that public participation and enjoined the actions for failure of public participation. 9 3 Section 309 mandates public
participation by procedures established in regulations, and there were
no such regulations. Consequently, the court had no trouble in finding,
without examination of specific BLM case files, that there was evidence
of probable success on the merits sufficient to issue a preliminary injunction. 9 4 The court enjoined actions as diverse as removal of overlapping
withdrawals within national parks and the opening of land to mineral
entry. 9 5 Apparently, to the court, this is the type of programmatic failure which no amount of local compliance will cure.
Section 310 of FLPMA 96 states that "[the Secretary, with respect to
the public lands, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
purposes of this Act." Section 310 came into play in National Wildlife
Federationwhen the plaintiffs argued that the BLM should have incorporated procedures for withdrawal review into regulations. 9 7 The alleged
requirement was not at all apparent to the BLM. In 1978, the Legislative and Regulatory Management Division of BLM rejected draft regulations governing withdrawal review because they were instructions to the
92. In exercising his authorities under this Act, the Secretary, by regulation, shall
establish procedures, including public hearings where appropriate, to give the
Federal, State and local governments and the public adequate notice and an opportunity to comment upon the formulation of standards and criteria for, and to
participate in, the preparation and execution of plans and programs for, and the
management of, the public lands.
43 U.S.C. § 1739(e) (1982).
NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1612(a), contains slightly less encompassing public participation
language which has yet to be at issue in any litigation.
93. See Federal Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 12-45, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271
(D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238), preliminary injunction aff'd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(describing public participation process generally and in the General Mountain Pass, Wyoming area).
94. Memorandum and Order Granting Preliminary Injunction December 4, 1985 at
17-18. Id. It should be noted thatJudge Williams took strong exception to this finding in
his dissent to the court of appeal's opinion upholding the preliminary injunction. 835
F.2d at 327. It is not inconceivable that the district court could have been swayed by this
strong opinion.
95. Affidavit of Joseph Martyak, Exhibit to Federal Defendants' Motion for Stay [of
order of Feb. 10, 1986] Pending Appeal, id.
96. 43 U.S.C. § 1740 (1982).
97. Amended Complaint, Count V, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp.
271 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238).
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agency rather than the public, and thus belonged in the BLM Manual
rather than the Code of Federal Regulations. 8 The courts have yet to
decide the validity of this argument, but it is not entirely without merit
since the BLM may reasonably intend some manual provisions to implement the purposes of FLPMA.
The strict interpretation of the rulemaking requirement advanced
by the plaintiff in National Wildlife Federation is not in harmony with the
general principals of administrative law or past court interpretations of
FLPMA. Normally, there is no obligation that regulations duplicate, or
unnecessarily elaborate, on standards expressed in statutes.9 9 The Sierra Club v. Watt court's finding of a lack of necessity for rules to implement Section 603 of FLPMA is an example.10 0 The problem will remain
until the courts have settled the rulemaking and public participation
requirements.
IV.

PROCEDURAL DEFENSES OF MINERAL PROPERTY INTERESTS

IN PUBLIC LANDS

If mineral lessees and claimants wish to protect their rights, then
they must go beyond arguing the adequacy of the agency's compliance
and take advantage of any procedural defenses. Often these are among
the most effective ways to protect property in public policy suits. Lessees and claimants should not assume they will be necessary parties or
be notified of pending litigation.' 0 1 Furthermore, if they do not participate, then they may lose their rights without ever having those rights
defended in court.
Where claimants' or lessees' property rights are at stake, a court will
normally grant their petition for intervention.' 0 2 In general, neither the
government nor environmental groups will oppose intervention so long
03
as the claimants or lessees petition to intervene prior to judgment.'
98. Affidavit I B of Frank Edwards at 5, Accompanying Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, id. The draft proposed regulations interpreting FLPMA § 204(l), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(i) (1982).
99. 3 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN &J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 1510 (1985).
100. 608 F. Supp. 305, 330 (E.D. Cal. 1985). See also Sagebrush Rebellion v. Hodel,
790 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1986) (no insistence on strict formal FLPMA hearing procedures in
designation of birds of prey conservation area). It is not inconceivable that there will be
another standard for mineral extractors.
101. Lessees in Connor found out about the suit after judgment. In National Wildlife
Federation, the plaintiff argued that Federal Register notice was inadequate notice to protect their interest, despite the fact that they read and commented regularly on Federal
Register notices. Ironically, the court agreed and then ordered its preliminary injunction
to be publicized through the Federal Register. In general, if a preliminary injunction is
issued, then a claimant or lessee will be informed of the suit and injunction when they
apply for any kind of permit or plan approval. Leases may be suspended. If there is no
injunction then operations may be permitted and no notice given.
102. See generally 70 C. WRIGHT, A MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§§ 1906-23 (2d ed. 1986).
103. There was no opposition to intervention by Mountain States Legal Foundation in
National Wildlife Federation or Sierra Club v. Watt, or to Placid Oil Company when they acquired a lease in the area affected by the Bob MarshallAlliance suit. The plaintiffs in Connor
did object to intervention by lessees and Mountain States. ASARCO, Inc. was denied in-
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Once in the case, the claimants or lessees should take advantage of procedural defenses by emphasizing those points where the law specifically
10 4
protects their interests.
A.

Standing

A defendant in any public policy environmental suit should first
consider questioning the standing of the plaintiff to bring the suit.
These suits approach the nature of generalized grievances that the
standing requirement is supposed to keep out of the courts.
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to "cases or controversies," and the courts have formulated a series ofjudicial tests to determine whether a plaintiff's grievance rises to
the level necessary for standing.' 0 5 The requirements are: (1) "injury
in fact;"' 10 6 (2) "fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed
injury and the challenged conduct;"' 0 7 (3) redressability of the injury by
the relief sought;' 0 8 and (4) the claim must fall into the "zone of interest" protected by the statute in question.' 0 9 These requirements must
be supported by more than mere allegations in the pleadings, and must
be provable at trial."10
The high point of standing in environmental cases was United States
v. SCRAP."' 1 The Supreme Court allowed a group of law students to
claim standing for an attenuated series of possibilities which the students argued would mean that an increase in rail freight rates would
raise the prices students paid and thereby cause them injury. 1 2 Because SCRAP was decided on a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the Court did not question the seemingly far-fetched scenario. It did set
tervention in National Wildlife Federation in July 1988. Apparently the court believed that
the suit had progressed so far that ASARCO's application was untimely.
104. Those defenses will be different for each claimant or lessee depending on his situation. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
105. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3531. to 3531.16 (2d ed. 1984). The Interior Board of

Land Appeals will also apply a standing requirement. See Mark A. Altman, 983 I.B.L.A.
265, GFS (O&G) 95 (1986) (rejecting standing for generalized grievance).
106. "The injury alleged must be, for example, 'distinct and palpable,' Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at
501), and not 'abstract' or 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical,' City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. [95], [101] (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974))." Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Injury in fact is also required to be personal injury. Purely
associational injury in the situation, without an allegation of personal injury by an agency
action, was rejected in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40 (1972). Associational
standing has almost crept back into the case law. See Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n, Inc.
v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1985) (implying in dicta that a larger, better organized organization might have standing). Any such development would work to National
Wildlife Federation's benefit, but would be unlikely to stand up to more thorough
argument.
107. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978).
108. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
109. This requirement exists when a challenge is brought under a particular statute.
Association of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
110. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 678-80.
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forth a process by which defendants in future cases could raise the issue
of fallacious allegations of standing. The process included motion for
more definite statement, discovery of standing facts, and motion for
summary judgment if the facts contained in amended pleadings and dis5s
covery do not meet the requirements of the judicial test."
Since judicial review under the APA is limited to review of "agency
actions,"' 14 each action should constitute a claim for which the plaintiff
must independently plead and prove standing. Standing for one claim
will not give standing for another.' '5
Single agency actions do not present a complicated standing problem. There is no question that the decision of an administrator to issue
an oil and gas lease, as in Bob MarshallAlliance, is an "agency action" and
a claim subject to challenge under APA. If that action injures a plaintiff,
then there will be standing. The decision of Secretary Watt contested in
Sierra Club v. Watt 116 seems to fall easily into the definition of an order,
and is consequently a challengeable "agency action." Injury from this
order could take place at many sites across the country.
In cases where the only line between different agency actions is the
same or similar procedure or program, a more difficult problem, and a
possible defense, is presented. If an agency takes two actions using the
same deficient procedure, then will injury by one action give standing to
challenge the other? For example, in National Wildlife Federation, if a procedurally deficient withdrawal revocation in Florida injures the plaintiff,
does he have standing to challenge a withdrawal revocation in Alaska
where he has never been?
The Supreme Court's recent standing case, Allen v. Wright, t I7 addressed a situation analogous to the programmatic challenges in National Wildlife Federation. The Court denied standing to black parents who
claimed that IRS procedures for granting tax exemptions to segregated
private schools were deficient."1 8 Although the Court characterized the
alleged injury as serious, it rejected standing on the ground that the
injury was not traceable to individual plaintiffs.' '9 The Court further
reasoned that because the injury depended on the actions of third parties and was otherwise speculative, the causation was too attenuated and
the "fairly traceable" element was further weakened. 120 None of the
plaintiffs could claim personal injury. The Court used analysis of considerations, such as separation of powers, that had formerly been pru113.

Id. at 689 n.15.

114. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1982).
115. See, e.g., Hartigan v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 746 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984)
(standing must be proven for each claim); Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525
F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (standing must be proven for each claim), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
933 (1976).
116.

608 F. Supp. 305, 311-13 (E.D. Cal. 1985).

117.
118.
119.
120.

468 U.S. 737 (1984).
Id. at 741-45.
Id. at 753-56.
468 U.S. 737, 758-59 (1984).
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dential considerations, in interpreting the fairly traceable element. 12 '
The Court found that standing issues in challenges to agency programs
22
are "rarely if ever appropriate for federal court adjudication."'
The analogy between Allen and National Wildlife Federation is particularly pronounced. In National Wildlife Federation, the plaintiff, on the basis of programmatic failure, asked the court to set aside virtually all
agency actions revoking withdrawals or terminating classifications over
the previous four and one-half year period. There were 814 specific
agency actions listed in the complaint.' 23 Because the various agencies
involved intended many of the actions to enhance environmental values, 12 4 these actions would seem, as a matter of common sense, to fail
the case or controversy requirement of article III.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals, in upholding the preliminary in12 5
junction, found that injury need not be shown for all 814 actions.
The court seemed to be relying on the programmatic challenge. Accordingly, the tough standard of Allen should apply.
In dismissing the National Wildlife Federation case for failure to prove
standing, the district court did not find it necessary to apply the heightened standard for programmatic standing set forth in Allen. Instead, the
district court relied on a recent analogous District of Columbia circuit
case involving public land actions over huge areas of Alaska.
In Wilderness Society v. Griles,1 2 6 the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia set forth a standard to prove standing where an environmental plaintiff claims injury by the actions of third parties on public
lands. The purpose of the test in Wilderness Society is to determine
"whether the plaintiff's future conduct will occur at the same location as
the [mineral developer's] response to the challenged government action."' 12 7 It must show: (1) where the land subject to the challenged
land actions are located; (2) that third parties will take actions on that
land; and, (3) that the plaintiff or its members use that land and will thus
28
be injured there.1
The district court found that the cursory "boilerplate"-like affidavits
121. Id. at 759-61. This development has been criticized as somehow making the concept of standing more irrational. See Nichol, Abusing Standings. A Comment on Allen v. Wright,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985) (criticizing the addition of separation of powers doctrine to
standing); Note, Muddying the Unclear Waters of Standing, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 171 (1985)
(court should not have used separation of powers to explain "fairly traceable" element).
The criticism seems unjustified in environmental policy suits which, in many respects, may
be more the province of Congress anyway.

122. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759-60 (1984).
123. Exhibit A to Amended Complaint, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F.
Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238),preliminaryinjunction aff d. 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir.

1987).
124. See Affidavit ofJoseph Martyak, Exhibit to Federal Defendants' Motion for Stay [of
order of Feb. 10, 1986] Pending Appeal, id.
125. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

126. 824 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
127. Id. at 12.
128. National Wildlife
dissenting).

Federation, 835

F.2d at

329 (Williams, J., concurring and
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submitted by the Wildlife Federation were not adequate to meet the test
of Wilderness Society.' 29 The district court's dismissal on summary judgment was not a complete surprise since the court of appeals had found
the Wildlife Federation's standing proof to be minimally sufficient to defend against a motion to dismiss where all presumptions are accorded
the plaintiff.' 3 0 The district court had also requested supplemental
briefing on standing. The court of appeals later rejected the Wildlife
Federation's requests for summary reversal and for reinstatement of the
injunction pending appeal.13'
While there is a slight possibility that the Wildlife Federation could
prevail on appeal or refile the case with better standing proof, the momentum of this case has shifted to the government and the claimants
and lessees. Even if the case is reinstated, the injunction will probably
not be reimposed. As in Wilderness Society, standing proved to be an effective defense.
B. Joinder
Joinder is an example of a procedural defense that should specifically protect claimants and lessees. Several environmental procedural
public land suits have addressed the issue ofjoinder of absent claimants
13 2
or lessees under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Nevertheless, this defense has been ineffective so far.
1. The Interest Protected by Rule 19
The first step in the joinder analysis is to determine whether the
interest sought to be defended rises to a level that justifies protection
under Rule 19. In Sierra Club v. Watt 133 and Northern Alaska Environmental
Center v. Hodel, 1 4 the Sierra Club sued to set aside administrative decisions which set the standards by which the Department would approve
mining plans of operation.1 3 5 The suits did not challenge the standards
themselves, but procedure used in making decisions that allowed application of the standards.' 3 6 In each case, mining claimants argued that
they were necessary parties under Rule 19 and, without their joinder,
the court should dismiss the case. 13 7 The mining claimants contended
129. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, No. 85-2238, slip op. at 9-13 (D.D.C.
Nov. 4, 1988). One affidavit alleged that one Federation member used an area of
5,000,000 acres, while another alleged use of 2,000,000 acres. A third alleged "informational" injury for any public land action with allegedly deficient environmental documentation anywhere in the nation.
130. 835 F.2d at 313. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
131. National Wildlife Fed, v. Burford, No. 88-5397 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 1988) (order).
132. Those cases are Sierra Club v. Watt, Conner, Northern Alaska Environmental Center, Sierra Club v. Penfold, and National Wildlife Federation. See generally 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M.
Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure §§ 1601-24 (2d ed. 1986) (general reference on
joinder).
133. 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
134. 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986).
135. 608 F. Supp. at 322.
136. 608 F. Supp. at 318, 321 n.27; 803 F.2d at 468-69.
137. 608 F. Supp. at 318; see 803 F.2d at 468-69.
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that if the Sierra Club prevailed in having protection of wilderness values included in the standards, then they would be precluded from developing their properties. 138 The court agreed with the Sierra Club, and
ignoring the property at stake, stated that a possible change in management standards was not an interest protected by Rule 19.139 In Northern
Alaska Environmental Center, the Ninth Circuit cited Sierra Club v. Watt to
140
reach the same conclusion on the rights at stake in that case.
In National Wildlife Federation, the District of Columbia Circuit further limited claimants' and lessees' rights under Rule 19. National Wildlife Federation, like Sierra Club v. Watt, involved hundreds or thousands of
mining claimants and mineral lessees, many of them outside the jurisdiction of the court. The potential effect of National Wildlife Federation was
much greater-the claimants could have lost their entire interest in the
event of an adverse decision. 14 1 Still, the court of appeals found that
claimants and lessees had only an expectancy, and no right to future
government approvals necessary to develop their claim or leases; therefore, they had no right protected by Rule 19. While the decision seems
to restrict this holding to issuance of a preliminary injunction, logical
extension to other situations could emasculate any rights of claimants
and lessees under the Mining Law and Mineral Leasing Act. The comparison of this holding with the Conner holding is ironic. In Conner, the
court found that an EIS was required because the lessee had an absolute
right to develop the lease.
Based on the cases decided thus far, a claimant or lessee could conclude that there is no private interest in public lands that rises to the
level protected by Rule 19. Either these cases portend a significant
change in mineral development on the public lands, or they will eventually be overruled as an excess of pro-environmental courts.
138. Section 603 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982), is a substantive amendment of
the General Mining Law. FLPMA § 302(b) 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982). The valid and existing rights protected under section 603 are only those rights actually being exercised as
of the passage of FLPMA. FLPMA § 701 (h), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 n.(h) (1982). If a claimant
was not actually mining as of October 21, 1976, he had no right to establish an operation
subsequently unless he met the stringent wilderness preservation standards. While the
Sierra Club v. Watt court found a right to operate, this is not necessarily so for rights acquired after the passage of FLPMA. See Opinion of Solicitor Coldiron, 88 I.D. 909 (Oct. 5,
1981). See also Watson, Mineral and Oil and Gas Development in Wilderness Areas and other Specially Managed Federal Lands in the United States, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 37 (1983);

Leshy, Wilderness and Its Discontents-WildernessReview Comes to the Public Lands, 1981 AM. ST.
L.J. 361 (argues for very restrictive or no mineral development under existing law); see
generally 1 AMERICAN LAW oF MINING § 15.03[2][b][i] (2d ed. 1984). The Mining in the
Parks Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1902-12 (1982), also supposedly protects valid and existing right,
see 1 AMERICAN LAw OF MINING § 17.02[l] (2d ed. 1984), but a similar restrictive result for
mining may be expected. See Novak, Mining and the National Park System, 2 J. ENERGY L. &
POL'Y 165 (1982).

139. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 322 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
140. Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1986)
(citing 3AJ. MOORE, W. TAGGERT &J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 19.07[2.-0]

(2d ed. 1985)).
141. See infra notes 216-25 and accompanying text.
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The "Public Rights" Exception toJoinder

The Supreme Court, in National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 1 4 2 recognized
an exception to the necessity ofjoinder under Rule 19 where the plaintiff seeks to vindicate purely public rights. The Court held that individual employees were not necessary parties in an action by the NLRB
against their employer, despite the fact that the action could affect the
employer's ability to perform a contract.1 43 In so holding, the Court
amended the NLRB's order to state that the employees could still enforce any rights against the employer that the contract specified while,
on the other hand, the employer could not enforce the contract against
the employees. 14 4 Unlike Rule 19, the exception seems to apply without
regard to the feasibility ofjoinder, though defendants could argue that
Rule 19(b) had displaced the public rights exception and thus made feasibility ofjoinder a requirement.
The courts in Sierra Club v. Watt, and Northern Alaska Environmental
Center determined that those cases met the requirements of National Licorice and held that the public rights exception was an alternative basis for
their holding in each case. The Connor court apparently relied solely on
National Licorice to find joinder of lessees unnecessary. 14 5 As the other
courts have done, the Ninth Circuit described the interests of lessees as
minimal and suggested that if the lessees ever did lose any of the legally
protected interests, then they may have damage claims against the
46
government.'
In each of the above cases, claimants' and lessees' arguments for
dismissal on procedural points have forced the court to deny what had
been perceived as a valid environmental claim. The reaction of courts
has been to deny the property rights of claimants and lessees, rather
than to deny the environmental claims. Claimants and lessees may do
better if they avoid framing the joinder issues as an "either/or"
proposition.
While defendants have advanced the joinder issue and public rights
exception as determined on the merits, the most important impact of
the exception may be on the limit it placed on the remedies available to
plaintiffs who use it. 14 7 The Court in National Licorice specifically modified the order of the NLRB to delete the language that stated that employee contracts were void. Connor seems to recognize this principle,
but negates its effect by assuming a suit for damages against the government is practical.148 This is a mistake no lease purchaser would make.
If the lessees had advanced a proposal on how the plaintiff's remedy
should be limited, then the outcome may have been different.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

309 U.S. 350 (1940).
Id. at 366.
Id. at 364-65, 367.
Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1458-62 (9th Cir. 1988).
848 F.2d at 1461.
Remedies are discussed below. See infra notes 319-22 and accompanying text.
848 F.2d at 1461.
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Exhaustion

Normally, an individual affected by an agency action cannot appeal
it to a federal court until the plaintiff has exhausted his or her administrative remedies.' 4 9 Exhaustion of remedies simply means that where
an agency action can be appealed within the agency, the individual must
first go through the agency appeals process, thus exhausting his administrative remedies before the courts will hear the case. Because administrative appeals have relatively short limitation periods, regulations may
preclude belated agency appeal if a court decides that exhaustion is
0
necessary.15
Among the policies and considerations for application of the exhaustion doctrine set out by the Supreme Court in McKart v. United
States, are: (1) whether a factual record, developed at the agency level, is
important; (2) whether the agency action involves expertise or discretion; and (3) whether a lack of exhaustion affects administrative efficiency. 15
Exceptions to exhaustion include situations where
administrative appeal would be futile, the outcome is predetermined,
there is no notice of the administrative action, or the plaintiff's challenge is to the validity of a statute. 152 Because of the number of exceptions and the fact that lack of exhaustion does not affect jurisdiction, the
ultimate decision whether to require exhaustion rests with the discretion
of the court. At least one commentator has suggested that the courts
will apply a "flexible balancing test" in determining whether exhaustion
53
should apply in NEPA cases.1
In National Wildlife Federation, the plaintiff never attempted to become involved in the formal administrative process. 154 The court of appeals advanced several reasons for not requiring exhaustion. First,
exhaustion was in the discretion of the trial court; second, exhaustion
would be futile; third, claimants and lessees rather than the government
had advance the defense; fourth, a factual record was unimportant to the
court; 1 5 5 and fifth, by implication, exhaustion was for those who followed issues at the local level, not those who chose challenges on a na56
tional scale. '
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Park County I, that exhaustion was
149. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969). Secretarial actions and
actions of the Chief of the Forest Service and the Interior Board of Land Appeals are final
agency actions that are appealable to the courts. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 502-19 (2d ed. 1984) (exhaustion and appealability).

150. E.g., 42 C.F.R. § 4.411 (1986) (general appeals of BLM decisions must be made
within 30 days).
151. 395 U.S. at 193-94.
152.

B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.31 (2d ed. 1984). See also Ecology Center

v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860, 865 (5th Cir. 1975) (notice required).
153.

D. MANDELKER, supra note 45, at § 4:22.

154. The plaintiff regularly commented on similar items noticed in the Federal
Register.
155. Judge Williams, in his dissent, strongly disagreed. He viewed the relation between fact and law as critical. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 332 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (Williams, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 316-18.
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unnecessary, virtually eliminated any effective use of the doctrine in
10th Circuit NEPA cases. 1 5 7 The court found that although the plaintiff
had chosen to delay, and thereby ignore the available agency process to
correct NEPA deficiencies, exhaustion was inapplicable because the requirements of NEPA were not truly requirements of the agency. Instead, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that because NEPA's mandate is
imposed from outside the agency, the courts are the appropriate forum
for initiation of NEPA challenges. 158 The holding is especially strong
because it found the district court had abused its discretion in applying
159
the exhaustion doctrine in this case.
While claimants' and lessees' recent experience with the exhaustion
doctrine has not been favorable, the argument is not without force.
There is no specific environmental exception to exhaustion, so those
opposing environmental suits should advance the argument whenever
possible. In the cases described in this paper, at least one judge has
been persuaded, 160 and there is potential that others will accept the
argument as well.
D. Laches
The equitable doctrine of laches will apply to bar a plaintiff's claim
where lack of diligence by the plaintiff results in a detrimental reliance
by the defendant. Generally, the courts will consider three factors: (1)
the length of delay, (2) the diligence of the plaintiff, and (3) the detrimental reliance of the defendant. As with exhaustion and standing,
there may be a relaxed application of the doctrine for environmental
plaintiffs.' 6 ' In NEPA cases, courts have often stated that the laches defense is not favored. 16 2 Nevertheless, it has, on occasion, been successfully argued.' 6 3 The suits that are the subject of this paper contain
laches arguments both as a defense on the merits and in application of a
remedy.
National Wildlife Federation presents the best opportunity for use of
laches as a defense on the merits. 16 4 The withdrawal review program
had been in existence since 1956 and was mandated in FLPMA in
157. Park County Resources Council v. Department of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 619-20
(10th Cir. 1987).
158.

Id. at 620.

159. Id.
160. Judge Williams in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford. 835 F.2d 305, 332 (D.C.Cir.
1987) (Williams, J., dissenting).
161. Save our Wetlands v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 549 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.
1977). See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2946
(1973).
162. See generally D. MANDELKER, supra note 45, at §§ 4.26-4.28.
163. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1337 (10th Cir. 1982)
(NEPA claim against Indian leases); Save Our Wetlands v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 549 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1977) (real estate development); Lathan v. Volpe, 455
F.2d 1111, 1122 (9th Cir. 1971) (highway).
164. Because laches was not argued until appeal of the injunction to the District of
Columbia circuit court, that court declined to address the issue. 835 F.2d at 318.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2

1976.165 The specific agency actions challenged in the suit were as
much as four and one-half years old at the time the suit was filed.t 6 6 All
of the revocation actions were published in the Federal Register,' 6 7 and
there was evidence of actual notice. 168 During the four and one-half
years, claimants and lessees have been acquiring interests in the affected
land and spending money on exploration and development. The doctrine should present a strong argument for older revocations but may
not apply to more recent ones.
The courts' bias against the use of laches in environmental suits was
recently underscored in Park County. The Tenth Circuit held that the
district court abused its discretion in holding that an environmental
plaintiff's deliberate delay of nearly two years for tactical reasons while
9
defendants expended a million dollars was grounds for laches.16
E.

Mootness

The doctrine of mootness, as applied to environmental procedural
suits, is similar to laches because it may depend on a plaintiff's lack of
diligence. 170 Where facilities have already been completed, the courts
have declared that the initial agency actions which allowed construction
are moot. In National Wildlife Federation, Conner, and Bob MarshallAlliance,
claimants and lessees argued that agency actions issuing leases, revoking
withdrawals, and terminating classifications had already occurred, were
not likely to be repeated, and consequently should be subject to the
mootness doctrine. All of the cases cited to support this proposition are
factually distinguishable from the public land cases because they deny
relief for NEPA claims on completed facilities, as opposed to administrative actions. 17 1 In National Wildlife Federation it is possible that individual
165. FLPMA § 204(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(1) (1982). Withdrawal review was instituted
by the BLM in 1956. It continued with greater and lesser effect through the time of the
PLLRC. See 2 C. WHEATLEY, JR., STUDY OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS ON PUBLIC
DOMAIN LANDS 420-25 (1969).

166. The National Wildlife Federation limited its challenge to those actions afterJanuary 1, 1981. Amended Complaint to page 16, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F.
Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238), preliminary injunction aff'd. 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir.
1987). Numerous revocations occurred prior to this date.
167. The complaint included a list. Amended Complaint Exhibit A, id.
168. See Affidavit IA of Frank Edwards at 9-10, Accompanying Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, id. See supra note 100.
169. Park County Resources Council v. Department of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 617 (10th
Cir. 1987).
170. See, e.g., Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1977). See generally D. MANDELKER, supra note 45, at § 4.25 (general discussion and listing of cases).
171. See, e.g., Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1983)
(spraying complete, but capable of repetition so mootness exception applies); Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1261,
1272-73 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Ogunquit Village v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1977) (with
stabilization of sand dune complete, NEPA does not require that "improvements" be removed). Mootness has operated to preclude NEPA and FLPMA claims in two recent but
different suits. In TOSCO v. Hodel, 804 F.2d 590 (10th Cir. 1986), ruling on motion for
interventionfrom, 611 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Colo. 1985), the State of Colorado and the National
Wildlife Federation were precluded from bringing NEPA and FLPMA claims after settlement between the government and claimant. The arguments were reintroduced in Lamm
v. Hodel, No. 87-F-190 (D. Colo. filed Feb. 4, 1987). In Northern Alaska Envil. Center v.
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claimants who had developed their properties prior to the suit could
present a credible defense on this point.
F. Statutes of Limitation
The Mineral Leasing Act states that "[n]o action contesting a decision of the Secretary involving any oil and gas lease shall be maintained
unless such action is commenced or taken within 90 days after the deci72
sion of the Secretary relating to such matter."'
Despite the apparent certainty of the statutory language, the Tenth
Circuit held in Park County that the limitation did not apply to NEPA
challenges. The court reasoned by analogy from a case applying a provision of the Marine Mammal Protection Act which limited judicial review of terms and conditions of permits issued under that act, but did
not limit review of the actual issuance of the permit. The court simply
ignored the far broader language of the Mineral Leasing Act provision
and found it did not apply. 17 3 In light of the rule that NEPA does not
repeal any other statute by implication, this ruling seems to be
vulnerable.
If Park County is not followed, then National Wildlife Federation may
also present an opportunity for application of the statute of limitations.
Unless a revocation is void ab initio, 174 there should be no remedy
against a lessee if a withdrawal revocation had been in place more than
ninety days prior to the suit.
G. Separate Consideration of Individual Claims
From an equity and policy perspective, if the environmental procedure attendant to agency decisions underlying an individual mining
claim or mineral lease meets the substantive goals of the statutes in
17 5
question, then the title to that mineral property should be sound.
For example, an EA or an EIS may have adequately informed the decisionmaker for some purposes but not others. In the context of Connor
and Bob Marshall Alliance, this could mean that leases on land without
wilderness values, or those whose leases contained CNSO stipulations,
76
may be more defensible.1
Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 at 469 (9th Cir. 1986), claimants' argument that NEPA compliance was
adequate was mooted by agreement of the Park Service to do an EIS.

172. 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1982).
173. 817 F.2d at 616-18. In order for the Park County court to reach the NEPA issue of
whether an EIS was required for lease issuance, it was necessary to find the laches, exhaustion, and statute of limitations issues adverse to the interests of the lessee. Ultimately the
holding on the EIS issue was a victory for the Forest Service and the lessee.
174. If the revocation is void ab initio then the lease may be void ab initio as well. See
infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
175. See Sagebrush Rebellion v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (FLPMA
procedures met by NEPA procedures); Friends of River v. FERC, 720 F.2d 93, 107 (D.C.

Cir. 1983) (FERC licensing hearing takes the place of NEPA procedure).
176. This is of theoretical concern only since the court of appeals in Conner apparently
described the whole of two national forests as "pristine wilderness." 836 F.2d 1521 (9th
Cir. 1988).
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Procedural defenses may apply differently to different claimants and
lessees as well. For example, a lessee affected by the National Wildlife
Federation suit may argue the Mineral Leasing Act statute of limitations
bars a challenge.' 77 Standing should apply independently to each revocation in National Wildlife Federation. Laches and mootness will apply dif178
ferently depending on the amount of reliance.
A geothermal lessee's intervention in National Wildlife Federation
demonstrated the effectiveness of presenting individual claims. Intervenor California Energy stated several defenses to the plaintiff's arguments, but received no opposition. 179 Ultimately, the court ruled that
the revocation in question was always open to geothermal leasing and
180
consequently there could be no remedy against the lessee.
Another way for a claimant or lessee to insure consideration of the
specific merits of an individual claim would be to bring a collateral suit.
Possible future continuation of National Wildlife Federation presents an
opportunity for such a suit because of its nationwide scope and egregious facts. A claimant or lessee could challenge the authority of the
BLM to enforce any injunction. Such a suit would undoubtedly face a
venue challenge, and notions of judicial comity might force it back into
the district court in Washington, D.C. In any case, exhaustion of administrative remedies, including IBLA appeal, could take as long as two
years.
H.

Conclusions Concerning ProceduralDefenses

Despite the apparent power of procedural defenses, they will be of
little avail unless claimants or lessees can convince ajudge that the equities of the case support them. Often, dismissals or judgments based on
these defenses are a way out of complicated or difficult cases, or an alternative to resolution of the merits where a case involves separation of
177. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
179. The response of the National Wildlife Federation was to claim that the injunction
did not apply to the California Energy situation, and thus they effectively raised no opposition to release of the company from the injunction. This was despite potential surface
disturbance from the development of geothermal resources. California Energy raised a
standing defense in its answer. It might have been very difficult for the Wildlife Federation to prove injury since the geothermal site is on a military reservation that is closed to
the public. There is no reason to believe that the National Wildlife Federation would not
oppose release of an operation that was more accessible or more to their disliking. The
court effectively released California Energy from the suit by holding that the area in question was always open to geothermal leasing. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, No. 852238 (D.C.C. Dec. 31, 1987). If there was a full fledged defense in National Wildlife Federation, that is, one where all claimants or lessees actively pursued their interests as did California Energy, the plaintiff and court would find themselves reviewing hundreds of
applications for relief from the suit. They would, in essence, take over some part of dayto-day administration of the public lands. At this point, the wisdom ofJustice O'Connor's
separation of powers and standing argument would become more readily apparent to the
court. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
180. Id. (order of Dec. 31, 1986).
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powers problems.' 8 ' As mentioned above, National Wildlife Federation
was especially amenable for resolution on procedural bases, and a more
persuasive presentation of the equities of that case may have been one
182
reason behind the standing dismissal.
V.

AFrER AN AGENCY Loss:

Is A CLAIMANT'S OR

LESSEE'S INTEREST TERMINATED?

Even if the agency decision which forms the basis of the claimants'
or lessees' property interest is 'set aside,' an interest is still retained
which can be restored with proper effort. To facilitate this restoration,
participation and vigilance should not end upon the issuance of an adverse judgment.
A.

Remedies as Distinguishedfrom Merits

Where courts have dealt with the actual disposition of property interests affected by environmental procedural suits, they have done so
without the aid of argument on what remedy is appropriate.1 83 In some
cases, consideration of property interests has been considered by district
84
courts on remand.'
The Example of Remedies under NEPA
In NEPA cases, courts will normally remand to the agency with a
mandatory injunction to re-do NEPA procedure so as to comply with the
court's order. 18 5 Typically, the agency does not abandon a project or
facility, but instead work is enjoined while an EIS, or a better EIS, is
done.' 86 Later, the project continues, assuming there is still political
support after years of litigation. Where a court finds a NEPA violation,
but the project is already completed, the case may be moot and no relief
may be forthcoming. 18 7 In other situations the agency has proceeded
with an EIS, or agreed to do an EIS, after the trial court's initial finding
88
and the case has been determined moot while on appeal.1
Even where a court finds environmental or other procedures deficient, it may not require remand to the agency. If the defect is technical
and further study would provide no useful information for the deci181. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 758-61 (1984) (separation of powers
as a basis of standing requirement).
182. It is the impression of some BLM employees that the justice department lawyers
who initially defended the .ational lWildlife Federation suit did not present a vigorous defense on the merits. The attorneys were replaced and the defense improved, but perhaps
too late.
183. E.g., Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988); Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d
786, 798 (9th Cir. 1975).
184. E.g., Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1413-15 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
185. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 45, at § 4:54 (scope of remedy).
186. This is the solution of the Ninth Circuit in Conner.
187. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
188. E.g., Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1986)
(National Park Service agrees to do cumulative EIS, thus meeting contest on that point).
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sionmaker, then there may be nothing for an agency to do.' 8 9 Since
especially thorough EAs may provide all of the useful information, the
preclusion of a remedy opens the possibility of a "substantial compliance" argument.' 9 0 A court has applied a similar sort of "substantial
compliance" standard to hearing requirements under FLPMA. l 9 '
B.

Termination of Mineral Leases

In Sierra Club v. Peterson,19 2 an environmental group tried to invalidate oil and gas leases issued with inadequate NEPA compliance. In an
earlier proceeding, the District of Columbia Circuit found NEPA compliance for a decision to issue oil and gas leases deficient because the
Forest Service had issued leases with exploration rights and had not
done an EIS. The circuit court stated that either a Conditional No Surface Occupancy ("CNSO") stipulation or an EIS could cure the problem
and remanded the case to the district court.193 On remand, the district
court, on the motion of the lessees and the agency, inserted the CNSO
stipulation into the leases. The district court rejected the Sierra Club's
contention that the leases were void. The Ninth Circuit followed this
remedy in Conner.
1. Contract Law as a Reason to Void Leases
Mineral leases are contracts between the federal government and
lessees, 19 4 and both contract law and administrative law govern their
execution. 19 5 On remand in Peterson, the Sierra Club presented arguments involving both contract law and administrative authority as reasons to void the leases.' 9 6 Because the district court decided, without
189. See, e.g., Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir.
1980) (study outside the formal ambit of NEPA supplants need for supplemental EIS);
Friends of River v. FERC, 720 F.2d 93, 107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (consideration of alternative at FERC licensing hearing obviates need for remand to supplement EIS).
190. This is to be distinguished from situations where environmental review has been
done outside the requirements of NEPA by agencies charged with protecting the environment, i.e., the Environmental Protection Agency. The courts have held that the procedure
of these agencies is "fundamentally equivalent" to the NEPA process. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 53 n.124 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1977). Functional equivalence will not apply to the Forest Service or BLM because their
mandates include duties other than environmental protection. Seegenerally D. MANDELKER,
supra note 45, at § 5:15.'
191. See Sagebrush Rebellion v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1986).
192. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983), on remand, Sierra Club v.
Peterson, No. 81-1230 (D.D.C. April 11, 1984) (Order adding CNSO Stipulation), enforcing, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
193. 717 F.2d at 1415.
194. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934); Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, 667 F.2d 949, 951 (10th Cir. 1982);John Bloyce Castle, 81 I.B.L.A. 53, GFS (O&G)
129 (1984). See generally 1 LAw OF FEDERAL OIL & GAS LEASES §§ 14.19-14.21 (1987).
195.

2 LAw OF FEDERAL OIL & GAS LEASES § 21.01 (1987).

196. Motion of the Sierra Club for Order Declaring Void Certain Oil and Gas Leases
Issued in the Palisades Further Planning Area and Cancelling Said Leases, Sierra Club v.
Peterson, No. 81-1230 (D.D.C. April 11, 1984).
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opinion, in favor of the lessees, we are left to infer what the basis of that
decision might have been.
The primary argument advanced by the Sierra Club was that contracts made in violation of the law or public policy are void, and therefore contracts made in violation of NEPA are void. To support this
proposition, they cited numerous cases outside of the NEPA context
which seem to make that point. t 9 7 The defendants responded by pointing out that, within the context of NEPA, there is no such consensus, nor
perhaps any authority for this proposition at all. 19 8 They also pointed
out that, outside of the NEPA context, the courts recognize many exceptions to the general rule advanced by the Sierra Club.' 9 9
The cases allowing contracts to remain effective despite NEPA violations are in themselves the strongest authority for the lessees. These
include the refusal of courts to void coal leases in Cady v. Morton2 0 0 and
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel 20 1 and the continued recognition of
power contracts in Forelaws on Board v. Johnson 202 and Port of Astoria v.
Hodel.20 3 In the coal leasing cases, the courts ordered the agencies to
reconsider lease issuance and enjoined new surface disturbing activity
while the NEPA review was conducted. 20 4 The courts did not enjoin
that work already underway.2 0 5 The power cases involved no particular
environmental disturbance, so the courts imposed no injunctions during
the time the EIS's were being completed. 20 6 In Astoria, the plaintiff's
197. A listing of the cases relied on by the Sierra Club is as follows: Lachman v.
Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1972); Northwest Airlines v.
Alaska Airlines, 351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Ewert v.
Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 138 (1922); Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U.S. 85, 94 (1912); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe, 184 U.S. 540, 548 (1902); Jordan v. Axicom Systems, 351 F.
Supp. 1134, 1135 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 489 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
198. See Federal Defendants' Opposition to Sierra Club's Motion for Order Declaring
Void Certain Oil and Gas Leases Issued in the Palisades Further Planning Area and Cancelling Said Leases, Sierra Club v. Peterson, No. 81-1230 (D.C.Cir. April 11, 1984), enforcing, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
199. See Intervenors Maddox, et al., reply to Motion of Sierra Club for Order Declaring
Void Certain Oil and Gas Leases Issued in the Palisades Further Planning Area and Cancelling Said Leases, id. The defendants might also have argued that there is substantial
doubt that the "transcendent rule" advanced by the Sierra Club even exists. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs § 178 (1979) (giving considerations or whether enforcement of a contract is avoidable on public policy grounds). See generally A. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 5.5 (1984) (suggesting a court will look at legislative intent, policy considerations, and perhaps malum prohibitum and malum in se).
200. 527 F.2d 786, 798 (9th Cir. 1975).
201. No. CV 82-116-BLG-JFB (Oct. 6, 1986), rev'don other grounds, 842 F.2d 224 (9th
Cir. 1988).
202. 743 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1004 (1986).
203. 595 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1979). See also National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States
Forest Serv., No. 83-1153-SO (memorandum and order of July 2, 1985) (preliminary injunction reported at 592 F. Supp. 931 (D. Or. 1984)) (NEPA is no basis for declaring
timber sales void ab initio); Sierra Club, et. al., 92 I.B.L.A. 290, GFS (Misc) 33 (1986) (court
will not void right-of-way grant for NEPA violations but will remand for additional
stipulations).
204. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, No. CV 82-116-BLG-JFB, slip op. at 6-7, (4th
Cir. Oct. 6, 1986).
205. Id. at 7; Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 798 (9th Cir. 1975).
206. Forelaws on Board v.Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1984); Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 479-80 (9th Cir. 1979).
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objection that if the court did not void the contracts, then the agency
would do a "grudging proforma compliance" with NEPA was overcome
20 7
by continued court supervision.
2.

Lack of Administrative Authority as a Reason to Void Leases

In Peterson, the Sierra Club also advanced two arguments directed at
the authority of the administrators to issue the leases. First, they argued
that the law bound the Secretary to cancel leases issued without proper
authority. 20 8 The authority for this proposition comes from cases interpreting the Mineral Leasing Act. Where the Secretary is, by statute,
without power to issue a lease he must cancel it if challenged. 20 9 Cancellation for violation of the Mineral Leasing Act requires a positive act
2 10
on the part of the Secretary, and the lease is not void ab initio.
NEPA may be distinguished from the Mineral Leasing Act because a
NEPA violation does not directly affect the Secretary's authority, but
merely subjects his decision to the possibility of being set aside under
the APA. The Secretary still retains discretion on how to comply with
NEPA. Since the opinion of the circuit court had approved the use of a
CNSO stipulation, it made sense for the district court to allow the
agency to exercise its discretion and not constier the leases void ab initio.
Assuming the lessees consent, there was no reason why the Secretary
should not add the stipulations prior to taking the affirmative step of
cancelling the leases.
Second, the Sierra Club argued that a rider to the Department of
the Interior Appropriation Act 2 1' which prohibited expenditures for
lease processing also prohibited addition of the stipulations. 2 12 Because
the appropriation rider exempted leases that were already in existence,
this argument requires some independent reason for the leases to be
void. In the absence of such a reason, no restriction applies.
If the agency issued leases on improperly revoked withdrawals then
the problem is more serious. The revocations could be void ab initio in
which the case the agency must cancel the leases, though applications
207. Port of Astoria, 595 F.2d at 480.
208. Motion of the Sierra Club for Order Declaring Void Certain Oil and Gas Leases
Issued in the Palisades Further Planning Area and Cancelling Said Leases at 5-6, Sierra
Club v. Peterson, No. 81-1230 (D.D.C. April 11, 1984), enforcing, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
209. See Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 476 (1963) (authority of Secretary to cancel
improperly issued leases). See, e.g., Navajo Tribe of Indians, 82 I.B.L.A. 387 GFS (O&G)
185 (1984) (lease mistakenly issued on Indian land cancelled); Robert Lyon, 78 I.B.L.A.
232 GFS (O&G) 54 (1984) (lease mistakenly issued in incorporated city limits cancelled);
Estate of Glenn F. Coy, Resource Service Inc., 88 I.D. 236, 52 I.B.L.A. 182 GFS (O&G) 28
(1981) (application transferred improperly so lease cancelled) (cited by Sierra Club).
210. 1 LAW OF FEDERAL OIL & GAS LEASES § 14.19[l] (1987).
211. Act of October 20, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-146 § 308, 97 Stat. 919 (similar prohibitions of spending to process lease application in further planning areas where included in
later appropriations acts).
212. Motion of the Sierra Club for Order Declaring Void Certain Oil and Gas Leases
Issued in the Palisades further Planning Area and Cancelling Said Leases at 13-15, Sierra
Club v. Peterson, No. 81-1230 (D.D.C. April 11, 1984), enforcing, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
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may be able to keep their priority. 2 13 Because mining claims would suf2 14
fer the same fate, the problem is discussed more thoroughly below.
C.

Termination of Interests Acquired under the General Mining Law

Although a valid mining claim confers substantial rights against the
government, if claimants locate their claims on land closed to mineral
entry, then they are void ab initio.2 15 An agency loss on the merits in
National Wildlife Federation might imply that the land was in fact legally
2 16
closed to mineral entry, and the claims located on that land are void.
1. Are Withdrawal Revocations Void Ab Initio?
If withdrawal revocations and classification terminations in National
Wildlife Federation are void ab initio, then claims located on land closed to
mineral entry may be void ab initio as well; but if the revocations are
merely voidable, then the claims may have been located on land that was
open to mineral entry, albeit only temporarily, and the claims would be
valid. For the alleged NEPA violations, specifically the failure to conduct a programmatic EIS, there is no reason to believe that the rules for
and contract precedent
revocations would be different from the lease
217
which do not mandate a void ab initio result.
The FLPMA violations present a more difficult problem. Because
the statute contains the authority of the agency the make revocations
and terminations, violations of the act could destroy that authority. If
the BLM must submit all withdrawal revocations to Congress, and must
only do classification terminations after completion of Resource Management Plans, as argued by the plaintiff, then there may be no authority
for the revocation and terminations. The revocations and terminations
2 18
would be nullities.
The Eighth Circuit addressed an analogous situation involving procedural violations of the Mineral Leasing Act in Arkla Exploration Co. v.
Texas Oil & Gas Corp.2 19 The government had failed to follow proper
procedures involving a known geologic structure ("KGS") determina213. Leases issued on land closed to mineral leasing must be cancelled. See Navajo
Tribe of Indians, 82 I.B.L.A. 387 GFS (O&G) 185 (1984) (lease mistakenly issued on Indian land cancelled); Robert Lyon, 78 I.B.L.A. 232 GFS (O&G) 54 (1984) (lease mistakenly issued in incorporated city limits cancelled); Estate of Glenn F. Coy, Resource Service
Inc., 88 I.D. 236, 52 I.B.L.A. 182 GFS (O&G) 28 (1981) (application transferred improperly so lease cancelled) (cited by Sierra Club).
214. See infra notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
215. David W. Harper, 74 I.D. 141, 80-1967-20 (Mining) (1967). 30 U.S.C. § 26
(1982). See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 35.11-2 (1986).

216. Lease could suffer a similar fate since cancellation is mandatory for leases issued
by mistake on land closed to mineral leasing.
217. Contracts should only be voidable as opposed to void ab initio. See supra notes 193206 and accompanying text.
218. See Federal Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 60-62, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271
(D.D.C. 1985), (No. 85-2238), preliminary injunction af'd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
219. 734 F.2d 347 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1984).
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tion. 2 20 The district court had declared that the noncompetitive oil and1
22
gas leases issued as a result of this determination were "invalid."1
The violation of procedural aspects of the Mineral Leasing Act may have
destroyed the authority to issue the leases.
Arkla may be distinguished from National Wildlife Federation because,
after the loss, the lessee was in the same position as immediately before
the suit-he had a lease application and priority. 22 2 In National Wildlife
Federation, existing property rights which had been partially explored or
developed may be voided. To date, the courts have given considerable
deference to the agencies' interpretation of FLPMA and such a strin2 23
gent interpretation would be a significant departure.
The plaintiff in National Wildlife Federation argued that the suit would
not invalidate existing claims and leases. 224 The court seemingly
agreed 22 5 but, inconsistently, has enjoined operations on existing claims
and leases.2 2 6 Either the court is confused or there is a real threat to the
property interest that is not being forthrightly discussed.
D.

Preservationand Restoration of the Mineral Property Interest

Once it has been determined that the lease or claim is not truly void
ab initio, lessees and claimants may take a number of steps to preserve
their property interest. Further actions before the agency and the district court may be required.
1.

Agency Obligation to Preserve Claimants' and Lessees' Rights

Where an added stipulation may cure a procedural defect, it may be
necessary to determine if the agency has an obligation to proceed with
the cure rather than cancel the lease. 22 7 Of course, the best and most

efficient course is to work with the agency, as the lessees did in Peterson,
220. Id. at 357-61.
221. Arkla Exploration Co. v. Watt, 562 F. Supp. 1214, 1227 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
222. The suit was filed immediately after the issuance of the non-competitive leases.
Arkla, 734 F.2d at 349-50. See generally Ekberg, Federal Oil and Gas Leasing: Developments in
Selected Problems and Issues, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 589, 630-40 (1983) (discussing
Arkla and KGS issues).
223. See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1986) (substantial
compliance and harmless error applied in agency actions under FLPMA); Columbia Basin
Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 599-600 (9th Cir. 1981) (agency interpretation of FLPMA given deference).
224. Answer of Respondent National Wildlife Federation to the Petition for Writ of
Prohibition at 11, In re Mountain States Legal Found., No. 68-5353 (D.C. Cir.).
225. Opinion and order of December 4, 1985 at 3, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford,
676 F. Supp. 271, (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238), aff'd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C.Cir. 1987).
226. Order of February 10, 1986, National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 835 F.2d
305 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
227. The BLM may require lessees to accept post lease stipulations that are required by
law. If lease stipulations may cure a defect as declared in court ruling that environmental
procedures had not been followed, then these stipulations may be interpreted as required
by law. In any case, the lessee will have the option of keeping the lease with the new
stipulations or refusing it. Cf Emery Energy, Inc., 67 I.B.L.A. 260, GFS (O&G) 252
(1982).
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to effect a favorable outcome. 2 28
To date, no agency has taken the position thai they would cancel
leases where they could cure the defects. Nevertheless, if an agency
takes this position, then the lessee may find some support in precedent
for cancellation on other grounds. Outside of the NEPA and FLPMA
context considered here, the agency may not cancel a lease unless cancellation is mandated by statutes or regulations. 229 However, if lessees
push this argument to the extreme, then there would be no reservation
of agency discretion to reject the lease and there could be a conflict with
cases which hold the exercise of this discretion to be permissible. 23 0 An
agency may still not be able to assume discretion to cancel in the absence of a specific court order. If it did take this position, then the rules
limiting the exercise of discretion in the first instance should restrict its
actions. For example, the BLM may not refuse a lease application unless
it has considered the use of stipulations to meet the concerns of the
government, 23 ' and the record must support the conclusion that it is in
the public interest to reject the lease application. 2 3 2 Consequently, the
claimant should be able to argue that cancellation, rather than cure, is
23 3
only reasonable in extreme cases.
2.

Are Agencies or Plaintiffs Estopped from Voiding
Property Interests?

Because lessees and claimants have relied to their detriment on the
actions of the agency and, in some cases the actions or inactions of the
plaintiffs, they may be able to assert estoppel against a claim that leases
or claims are void. Estoppel against the government has been recog23
nized in the federal courts and is well established in the Ninth Circuit.

4

The necessary elements as set forth in Georgia-Pacific Co. v. United
States 23 5 are:

(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) the party
to be estopped must intend that his conduct shall be acted on
or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right
to believe it is so intended; (3) the party seeking to estop the
latter must be ignorant of the facts; and (4) the party seeking to
23
estop must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.

6

228. The Forest Service and the lessees agreed on the insertion of the CNSO stipulation as presented and both argued the same points before the district court on remand.
See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
229. John Bloyce Castle, 81 I.B.L.A. 53, GFS (O&G) 129 (1984); Beverly M. Harris,
Aminoil, 78 I.B.L.A. 251, GFS (O&G) 57 (1984).
230. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 798 (9th Cir. 1975) (preserving lease but reserving discretion on reconsideration of issuance).
231. Robert G. Lynn, 76 I.B.L.A. 383 (1983) GFS (O&G) 10 (1984); Western Interstate
Energy Co., 71 I.B.L.A. 19, GFS (O&G) 94 (1983).
232. Eagle Exploration Co., 69 I.B.L.A. 96 (1982) GFS (O&G) 12 (1983).
233. See Horace H. Alvord IV, 80 I.B.L.A. 49 GFS (O&G) 97 (1984).
234. See generally Parcel, Making the Government Fight Fairly: Estopping the United States, 27
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 41(1982).

235. 421 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970).
236. Id. at 96.
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The Ninth Circuit has broadened the requirement of knowledge on
the part of the government to include situations where an agency knew
or should have known the facts. 2 37 The courts will apply a balancing
test to determine if the interests of the United States outweigh those of
2 38
the private party. If they do not, then a court may allow estoppel.
National Wildlife Federationseems to meet all of the Georgia-Pacificcriteria. If the BLM loses on the merits in National Wildlife Federation, then it
will be apparent that they should have known the proper procedures for
revoking withdrawals and terminating classification. On the other hand,
it does not seem reasonable to expect a claimant or lessee relying on the
agency's regular and proper functioning to know of the procedural errors. The agency's posting of Federal Register notices opening the land
to mineral entry clearly anticipated and invited reliance by claimants. 2 39
In cases such as Conner,24 0 where the lessees were never notified of
the suit or served with a notice of lis pendens, 24 1 lessees could argue that
the plaintiffs are estopped from claiming that their leases are void. Not
only did the lessees rely on the indirect representation of the government that their title was good, 2 42 but they could also argue that they
relied on the duty of the plaintiffs to file a notice of lispendens, seek a stay
or an injunction, or otherwise notify them of the suit if plaintiff's claim
of the property interest was invalid. An environmental group filed a notice of lis pendens in one other recent NEPA case where the title to property was in question, 2 43 and there seems to be no impediment to such a
filing in Conner. If the plaintiffs are to be estopped from claiming the
leases are void in Conner, then they must have intended that the defendants rely on their actions or inactions. Since this is unlikely, the reliance
elements will have to come from a duty under the lis pendens statutes or
other law.
3.

Laches, Mootness, and Joinder as Limits on Plaintiff's
Remedies

Even if the equitable defenses of laches and mootness are not
strong enough to bar the plaintiff's claims against the government, they
237. United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406, 412 (9th Cir. 1975).
238. Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 748 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975). See Parcel, supra
note 233, at 48-52. a proprietary-sovereign function distinction may enter into the analy-

sis of estoppel problems as well. Leases and environmental protection seem to fall into
both categories. See id. at 46-48.
239. The notices typically stated where and how much land would be open to mineral
entry. Specific provisions, such as time of opening, were provided in anticipation of competing interests locating or filing on newly opened land.
240. The court of appeals decision in Conner avoids the cancellation problem by creating no surface occupancy leases. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1449-50 (9th Cir.
1988).
241.

28 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).

242. The Forest Service continued to issue permits for seismic exploration in the Flathead and Gallatin National Forests while the suit was pending. Signal of Montana and
Geodata, Inc. invested several tens of millions of dollars in seismic work which they sold to
lessees.
243. See City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1986) (Sierra Club
files notice of lis pendens in Alaska).

1989]

MINING CLAIMS AND MINERAL LEASES

may still be strong enough to limit any injunctive remedy, especially as it
affects claimants or lessees. Because such relief is equitable, the court
should consider these other equitable concepts.
If necessary parties are not joined, Rule 19(b) mandates that the
court consider limiting the scope of relief to avoid injuring absent parties. 2 4 4 Since the court exercises discretion over any relief, those asserting the interests of absent claimants and lessees should present a strong
5
argument that the court tailor the relief to preserve their interests.2 4 If
a court applies the "public rights" exception to joinder, even in the alternative, then the allowed remedy should not alter the rights of claimants or lessees. 246 To enforce this proposition and get an agency to
issue permits, it may be necessary to prevail in a collateral suit. 24 7 Such
a suit would be extremely difficult to win but would force the courts to
face an inherent contradiction in the use of this doctrine if they enjoin
third party rights.
4.

Suspension of Leases

When an agency loses a procedural suit, a lessee will want to preserve the term of the lease and save on rental payments by accepting
suspension of the lease during appeal or compliance with environmental
procedural statutes.2 4 8 An injunction may cause the agency to initiate
steps to suspend a lease. In theory, suspension will not preclude seismic
or other surface geological or geophysical exploration, but it will pre24 9
clude issuance of an APD.
If the lessee initiates suspension, then the agency may take the opportunity to add onerous stipulations as a condition of suspension. 250
While it is possible that such stipulations could be favorable to the government's case, they may not be agreeable to the operator's needs and
perception of the case. It may be possible for a lessee to simply turn
down a requested suspension once it is offered with the onerous
251
stipulations.
244. See supra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
246. The specific issue of limitation or relief when the "public rights" exception to
joinder is applied is discussed above. See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
247. There was no specific injunction in Conner, see 605 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D. Mont.
1985), but there was in National Wildlife Federation. See Order of Feb. 10, 1986, 676 F. Supp.
271 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-2238), aff'd 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See also supra notes
176-79 and accompanying text (mentioning collateral suits).
248. 30 U.S.C. § 209 (1982) authorizes suspension for "conservation purposes." This
has been held to include conservation in the environmental sense as well as conservation
of oil and gas. Copper Valley Machine Works v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 600 (D.C. Cir.
1981). Regulations at 43 C.F.C. § 3103.4-2 (1986) interpret the statute. See generally Peterson, Extensions and Suspensions of Federal Oil and Gas Leases, Paper 12, pp. 12-19 to
12-34, Overthrust Belt-Oil and Gas Legal and Land Issues (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fed'n
1980).
249. Drilling is a lease activity. 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160 (1986).
250. See Getty Oil Co. v. Clark, 614 F. Supp. 904, 915 (D. Wyo. 1985) (stipulation
added to give authority to deny later activity), afftg, Sierra Club, et al., 80 I.B.L.A. 251, 260
GFS (O&G) 119 (1984) (includes text of stipulation).
251. If the lease term is near its end, as it was in Getty, then this may not be an option.
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If a preliminary injunction denies access to a lease, then the Mineral
Leasing Act and the regulations recognize a mandatory suspension of
lease payments and the lease term despite any lack of paperwork by the
agency. 2 52 In this situation, a lessee may retroactively recover the payments and any lost lease term. 253 Unfortunately, the problem of retroactive recoupment of rentals and term is more difficult where there is no
preliminary injunction and the lessee instigates the suspension proceedings. To date, the BLM has taken the position that it may only grant
suspensions as of the date of application. 2 54 However, if the court's order is retroactive and the leases are void, then contract principals should
allow recovery.
5.

Motion for Clarification or Amended Judgment

During the litigation of the merits, the parties may ignore or give
little consideration to arguments on the nature of the relief that the
court should grant if the environmental groups win. 2 55 As a result, the
plaintiff's relief may be harsher than necessary and lessees or claimants
will want to move for amended judgment or clarification 2 56 to include
interim remedies, such as lease suspension, that may lessen the impact.
This is especially true if a court has declared leases or claims void. In
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, a Montana federal district court's initial
relief was to cancel several coal leases. On a motion to amend the judgment, the court, citing Cady v. Morton,2 5 7 changed its decision and suspended most of the leases pending NEPA compliance but allowed
operations to continue on those leases adjacent to existing
2 58
operations.
6.

Congressional Restoration

Because of the incredibly broad scope of the National Wildlife Federation preliminary injunction, and the apparent complexity of the
problems, some of those affected have gone to Congress to get relief.
The 99th Congress passed several bills exempting specific actions or areas from the suit. 25 9 All of the congressionally exempted land actions
were for activities other than mineral development. Still, it is not incon252. See Copper Valley Mach. Works v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(mandatory suspension during time when lessee is denied access).
253. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.4-2(c) (1986). Copper Valley Machine, 653 F.2d at 603.
254. Paul Kohlman, a party and lessee in Bob MarshallAlliance, was denied retroactive
repayment of rentals.
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ceivable that a mineral development that had the support of a local community could receive similar treatment, with proper political effort.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The procedures Congress has developed to govern the administration of the public lands unquestionably serve important public policy
objectives. Environmental studies, public participation, and expression
of administrative standards in regulations result in informed decisionmaking which benefits both mineral developers and environmental
groups. Yet, when the procedures become the means to throw federal
land management into turmoil and cause the waste of millions of resource exploration dollars, the cost greatly outweighs the benefit. Beyond the waste of dollars, our nation will be less likely to develop
valuable public resources because of title uncertainties.
The courts have neither challenged the authority of the administrators to make the land management decisions in Connor v. Burford, Bob
Marshall Alliance v. Watt, National Wildlife Federation v. Burford and Sierra
Club v. Watt, nor challenged the good faith of any parties involved. The
courts have simply held that the agencies made the decisions with the
wrong procedure. Yet, the agencies' decisions have been set aside at
great cost or risk to third party mining claimants and mineral lessees. It
seems that the process has overcome the substance of the decisions.
Claimants and lessees can protect themselves by working with the
administrative agencies. Under the current state of the law, to avoid major environmental review of leasing or exploration, mineral lessees may
have to allow the agencies to reserve discretion to terminate their
projects for environmental concerns. This undoubtedly holds some
risk, but from a business perspective, that risk is much less than the risk
of not finding a valuable mineral deposit. To date, while the agencies
have insisted on environmental mitigation, they have not used restrictive
lease stipulations to stop projects.
In many respects the environmental suits discussed in this paper act
as a monkey wrench thrown into the public lands administrative machinery. The National Wildlife Federation has stopped the machinery with
its suit, halting more conservation projects than any group of developers
could ever hope to stop. The courts can end this kind of obstruction by
giving deference to administrative decisions on what procedure is required, and by applying doctrines such as laches, mootness, standing,
exhaustion, joinder and the statute of limitations. In the pending actions, the courts have the opportunity to use these doctrines and place
the administration of the public lands back in the hands of the agencies,
where Congress always intended it to be. Congress should not have to
pass special legislation to facilitate minor land management decisions.
While the suits may affect federal administrative decision process,
their effect on the property interests of third parties is not at all certain.
The remedies accorded plaintiffs in these suits may not invalidate the
rights of claimants or lessees. If they appear to do so, then they may be
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beyond the power of the courts, especially if all of the leases and claimants are not joined. But the holders of mineral interests cannot count
on the courts deciding in their favor if they are absent. Individual claimants and lessees have to go into court and specifically argue why their
interests are not valid. If and when they do so, their chances of success
are good.

